Estrategia Española de Seguridad y las 'viejas nuevas' guerras y guerrillas

Puntalmente, con precisión algo más que artillera, llega desde The Society for Military History mi copia en papel de Journal of Military History Vol. 74, No. 1. January 2010,

El volumen viene cargado, en buena parte, por expertos en Histora de España, alguno de ellos amigos míos. Citaré alguna de sus entregas, no forzósamente dedicadas al Reino, pero en gran medida atentas a las guerras de guerrilla, adoptado el enfoque integral y la conceptuación híbrida en la selección tras su lectura.

Destaco en todo caso, con su formalidad clásica, la brilllantísima pieza de Andrew Gordon (vid. infra) sobre la operación conjunta de desembarco en el puerto fortaleza de Illig, in Somaliland, in 1904 durante la insurgencia del llamado Mad Mullah -una especie de Abd El Krim más elusivo- en Somalia entre 1899 y 1920. Batido también por la aviación COIN de la RAF, Sayyīd Muhammad `Abd Allāh al-Hasan (en somalí: Sayid Maxamed Cabdille Xasan, en árabe: محمّد عبد اللّه حسّان‎ ) nacido el 7 de april de 1856, Buuhoodle murió el 21 de diciembre de 1920 en Imi, Ogaden), víctima de la gripe. En la foto, su casa fuerte en Taleex.

Articulos y reseñas más recomendables, en mi opinión, para los combatientes españoles civiles y militares:


Geoffrey Parker, “States Make War but Wars also Break States,” The Journal of Military History 74 #1 (January 2010): 11-34.

An unprecedented spate of wars and revolutions took place around the world in the mid-seventeenth century. Many contemporaries, followed by many historians, have argued that the former caused the latter; few have considered other factors. This essay seeks to clarify the issues at the heart of the “General Crisis Debate” among early modern historians by examining evidence from around the world, including newly available data on global climatic change. It concludes, first, that only a synergy between natural and man-made disasters produced state-breakdown; and, second, that “coping skills” critically affected the impact of these disasters.

Paul Kennedy, “History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War,” The Journal of Military History 74 #1 (January 2010): 35-51.

Writing on modern warfare lately has tended to focus upon two vital but divergent trends, which might be termed the War from Above and War from Below schools of analysis. This essay concentrates instead upon the middle levels of warfare, drawing examples from mid-World War Two, where the chief operational objectives of the Allies were clearly established (at Casablanca, January 1943), but had yet to be realized. The realization of such military goals as defeat of the U-boat threat, or gaining domination of the air over Europe, in turn required breakthroughs that could only come from what one might term “the mid-level managers of war” -- inventors, scientists, civil servants, captains of naval squadrons, and commanders of air groups. Scholars of these campaigns have long recognized the importance of the changes that occurred at the operational level of war between 1943 and 1944; this essay offers a larger synthetic analysis of their argument.

Yuval Noah Harari, “Armchairs, Coffee, and Authority: Eye-witnesses and Flesh-witnesses Speak about War, 1100–2000,” The Journal of Military History 74 #1 (January 2010): 53-78.

Is it necessary to understand the experience of war in order to understand war? And is it possible to understand the experience of war at second hand? This article surveys how soldiers, scholars, and the general public approached and answered these questions from the eleventh century to the twentieth century. The article thereby offers a long-term history of war-witnessing, and of the authority it carried. It argues that the Middle Ages and early modern era were dominated by the eye-witness, who drew authority from the observation of objective facts. The late modern era is dominated by the flesh-witness, who draws authority from undergoing subjective experiences.

Andrew Gordon, “Time after Time in the Horn of Africa,” The Journal of Military History 74 #1 (January 2010): 107-144.

Andrew Gordon explores the joint, amphibious assault on the dervish stronghold of Illig, in Somaliland, in 1904. The operation exactly matched the task, and the skills employed were taken down from the Royal Navy’s shelf without rehearsal or conscious innovation. Those in command had not been to Staff College, yet at Illig one can check off today’s Principles of War, one by one. The quintessentially Victorian 'littoral warfare era' was soon eclipsed by the blue-water rivalry of the twentieth century, but it has enjoyed renewed interest at the start of the twenty-first—especially where the security condition of the Horn of Africa is concerned.

Charles Esdaile, “Spain 1808 – Iraq 2003: Some Thoughts on the Use and Abuse of History,” The Journal of Military History 74 #1 (January 2010): 173-188.

This article examines the frequent comparisons drawn between the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the French intervention in Spain in 1808. In brief, George Bush and Napoleon Bonaparte have been said to have been driven by the same motivation--according to taste, imperialism, hubris or misplaced crusading fervor--and to have achieved the same result, namely an unwinnable guerrilla war fuelled by xenophobia and fundamentalist religion. Whilst no attempt is made to attack the opposition to the war in Iraq from which these claims stem, it is here argued that they rest on a false impression of the Peninsular War of 1808-14 that is in large part derived from, first, the construction of a national myth in nineteenth-century Spain, and, second, the desire of French veterans and historians to explain away Napoleon’s defeat in Spain and legitimise his cause. In short, then, this article argues that, just as intelligence was spun to support the cause of intervention, so history has been spun to support its anti-thesis.


The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China, by Jay Taylor, reviewed by Robert A. Kapp and by Gerrit van der Wees, 201-204.

Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975, by John Prados, reviewed by Mark Moyar and by John M. Carland, 207-212.

Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes, by Patrick Porter, reviewed by Robert Johnson, 212-214.

The Indian Militia and Description of the Indies, by Captain Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, translated by Timothy F. Johnson, edited by Kris Lane, reviewed by Patricia Seed, 219-221.

The Enemy at the Gate: Habsburgs, Ottomans and the Battle for Europe, by Andrew Wheatcroft, reviewed by Karl A. Roider, 222-224.

Borderlines in Borderlands: James Madison and the Spanish-American Frontier, 1776-1821, by J. C. A. Stagg, reviewed by David S. Heidler, 226-227.

Peninsular Eyewitnesses: The Experience of War in Spain and Portugal, 1808-1815, by Charles Esdaile, reviewed by Erica Charters, 234-235.

Eagles and Empire: The United States, Mexico, and the Struggle for a Continent, by David A. Clary, reviewed by Timothy D. Johnson, 243-245.

Unzivilisierte Kriege im zivilisierten Europa? Die Balkankriege und die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland, England und Irland 1876-1913, by Florian Keisinger, reviewed by Stefan Goebel, 254-255.

Memories of Two Wars: Cuban and Philippine Experiences, by Frederick Funston, reviewed by Graham A. Cosmas, 260-261.

World War One: A Short History, by Norman Stone, reviewed by Michael S. Neiberg, 266-267.

The White War: Life and Death on the Italian Front 1915-1919, by Mark Thompson, reviewed by John Gooch, 267-268.

Sydney, Cipher and Search: Solving the Last Great Naval Mystery of the Second World War, by Peter Hore, reviewed by Robin Higham, 287.

Deciphering the Rising Sun: Navy and Marine Codebreakers, Translators and Interpreters in the Pacific War, by Roger Dingman, reviewed by E. Bruce Reynolds, 291-292.

The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War, by Nicholas Thompson, reviewed by Gail Yoshitani, 306-307.

War in European History, by Michael Howard, reviewed by Brian Holden Reid, 307-308.

Naval Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations: Stability from the Sea, edited by James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, reviewed by Gordon E. Hogg, 314-315.

Blood and Capital: The Paramilitary of Colombia, by Jasmin Hristov, reviewed by Michael J. LaRosa, 315-317.

A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq, by Mark Moyar, reviewed by David Ucko, 318-320.

Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces, edited by C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, reviewed by David M. Witty, 320-322.

The Least Worst Place: Guantanamo’s First 100 Days, by Karen Greenberg, reviewed by Stephen Irving Max Schwab, 322-323.

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, by David Kilcullen, reviewed by Lester W. Grau, 323-324.

The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Bases, edited by Catherine Lutz, reviewed by Hal M. Friedman, 324-325.

Film Review Essay:

The Moroccan Labyrinth. Screenplay by Julio Sánchez Veiga. Video. Icarus Films. 2007. Reviewed by José E. Alvarez and by Geoffrey Jensen, 326-329.

1 comentario:

Anónimo dijo...

El de Gordon será bueno. Su historia de Jutlandia sigue siendo de lo mejor que se ha escrito. Ojalá se tradujese (competentemente).

Su historia de la RN en el periodo de entreguerras, menos conocida, es aún más interesante aunque menos magistral.

El de Esdaile, así así. Tiene sus días. El problema de lo que trata es la pregunta que un profesor mío me hizo una vez en voz alta. ¿Si los españoles fueron maestros del mundo entero en guerra de guerrillas en 1808, por qué no pudieron derrotarlas en 1834?

Tendré que poner a mis contactos a conseguirme copia.


El Encubierto.