Excelente resúmen el de Pedro Rodríguez en ABC sobre la presentación de la propuesta de presupuestos de Defensa hecha por Robert Gates ayer: El Pentágono centra sus nuevas prioridades armamentísticas en la contrainsurgencia. La única crítica es lo contundente del titular. El enfoque no es hacia la insurgencia, sino ante las guerras que se están librando o pueden librarse en un inmediato futuro...
En el papel original hay anuncios de sustancia adicionales en los que gestores públicos, empresas e intereses españoles pueden tener algo que decir. Van a ir cambiando muchas cosas sin olvidarse de lo principal: la industria está al servicio de la Defensa, no al revés. Servidor cree que todo el mundo saldrá ganando: las empresas más dinero, los militares y el conjunto de la población más seguridad. Así:
DoD News Briefing With Secretary Gates From The Pentagon
PRIORIDADES DE REFORMA INSTITUCIONAL
En el papel original hay anuncios de sustancia adicionales en los que gestores públicos, empresas e intereses españoles pueden tener algo que decir. Van a ir cambiando muchas cosas sin olvidarse de lo principal: la industria está al servicio de la Defensa, no al revés. Servidor cree que todo el mundo saldrá ganando: las empresas más dinero, los militares y el conjunto de la población más seguridad. Así:
DoD News Briefing With Secretary Gates From The Pentagon
PRIORIDADES DE REFORMA INSTITUCIONAL
... our struggles to put the Defense bureaucracies on a war footing these past few years have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences and reward structures of America's Defense establishment -- a set of institutions largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern navies, armies and air forces. Programs to directly support, protect and care for the man and woman at the front have been developed ad hoc and funded outside the base budget.
Put simply, until recently, there has not been an institutional home in the Defense Department for today's warfighter. Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and a bureaucratic constituency similar to conventional modernization programs.
SISTEMAS OPERATIVOS
(...)
Put simply, until recently, there has not been an institutional home in the Defense Department for today's warfighter. Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and a bureaucratic constituency similar to conventional modernization programs.
SISTEMAS OPERATIVOS
(...)
We will increase manned ISR capabilities such as the turboprop aircraft deployed so successfully as part of Task Force ODIN in Iraq. We will initiate and -- research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimized for today's battlefield.
(...)
... we will add $200 million to fund the conversion of six additional Aegis ships to provide ballistic-missile-defense capabilities.
... to improve cyberspace capabilities, we will increase the number of cyber experts this department can train from 80 students per year to 250 per year in FY '11.
... to replace the Air Force's aging tanker fleet, we will maintain the KC-X aerial refueling tanker schedule and funding, with the intent to solicit bids this summer.
... to improve cyberspace capabilities, we will increase the number of cyber experts this department can train from 80 students per year to 250 per year in FY '11.
... to replace the Air Force's aging tanker fleet, we will maintain the KC-X aerial refueling tanker schedule and funding, with the intent to solicit bids this summer.
(...)
PRINCIPIOS DE ADQUISICIÓN Y CONTABILIDAD EFICIENTES
In today's environment (...), and conventional edge requires a dramatic change in the way we acquire military equipment. I believe this needed reform requires three fundamental steps. First, this department must consistently demonstrate the commitment and leadership to stop programs that significantly exceed their budget or which spend limited tax dollars to buy more capability than the nation needs. Our conventional modernization goals should be tied to the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries, not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary given unlimited time and resources. I believe the decisions that I am proposing accomplish this step.
Second, we must ensure that requirements are reasonable and technology is adequately mature to allow the department to successfully execute the programs. Again, my decisions act on this principle by terminating a number of programs where the requirements were truly in the exquisite category and the technologies required were not reasonably available to affordably meet the program's costs or scheduled goals.
Third, realistically, we must estimate, realistically, program costs provide program stability for the programs we initiate, adequately staff the government acquisition team and provide disciplined and constant oversight. We must constantly guard against so-called requirements creep, validate the maturity of technology at milestones, fund programs to independent cost estimates and demand stricter contract terms and conditions.
PRINCIPIOS DE ADQUISICIÓN Y CONTABILIDAD EFICIENTES
In today's environment (...), and conventional edge requires a dramatic change in the way we acquire military equipment. I believe this needed reform requires three fundamental steps. First, this department must consistently demonstrate the commitment and leadership to stop programs that significantly exceed their budget or which spend limited tax dollars to buy more capability than the nation needs. Our conventional modernization goals should be tied to the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries, not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary given unlimited time and resources. I believe the decisions that I am proposing accomplish this step.
Second, we must ensure that requirements are reasonable and technology is adequately mature to allow the department to successfully execute the programs. Again, my decisions act on this principle by terminating a number of programs where the requirements were truly in the exquisite category and the technologies required were not reasonably available to affordably meet the program's costs or scheduled goals.
Third, realistically, we must estimate, realistically, program costs provide program stability for the programs we initiate, adequately staff the government acquisition team and provide disciplined and constant oversight. We must constantly guard against so-called requirements creep, validate the maturity of technology at milestones, fund programs to independent cost estimates and demand stricter contract terms and conditions.
ENFOQUE INTEGRAL
Some will say I am too focused on the wars we are in and not enough on future threats. The allocation of dollars in this budget definitively belies that claim.
But it is important to remember that every Defense dollar spent to overinsure against a remote or diminishing risk or, in effect, to run up the score in capability where the United States is already dominant is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I will not take.
As I told the Congress in January, this budget represents an opportunity; one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity, to critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements, those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead; an opportunity to truly reform the way we do business.
I will close by noting that it is one thing to speak generally about the need for budget discipline and acquisition and contract reform; it is quite another to make tough choices about specific systems and Defense priorities based solely on the national interest and then stick to those decisions over time.
To do this, the president and I look forward to working with the Congress, industry and many others to accomplish what is in the best interest of the nation as a whole.
But it is important to remember that every Defense dollar spent to overinsure against a remote or diminishing risk or, in effect, to run up the score in capability where the United States is already dominant is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I will not take.
As I told the Congress in January, this budget represents an opportunity; one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity, to critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements, those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead; an opportunity to truly reform the way we do business.
I will close by noting that it is one thing to speak generally about the need for budget discipline and acquisition and contract reform; it is quite another to make tough choices about specific systems and Defense priorities based solely on the national interest and then stick to those decisions over time.
To do this, the president and I look forward to working with the Congress, industry and many others to accomplish what is in the best interest of the nation as a whole.
3 comentarios:
Vaya parece que van justo en la direccion contraria a la tomada por España que mantiene los gastos para grandes proyectos pero baja los de adiestramiento y personal... Es lo que pasa cuando no se sabe en que mundo se vive.
Saludos cordiales.
Yo opino que Afganistán es el menos importante de los asuntos importantes de los temas político-militares (Rusia, China, Irán, Corea del Norte) que afronta Obama (aunque es verdad que es el más urgente). Retirarse de ese país sin haber ganado (perder la guerra), no será ninguna catástrofe para la seguridad de USA y Occidente. De la misma manera que retirarse de Vietnam y haber perdido buena parte del sudeste asiático, no llevó a oleadas de comunistas a invadir los USA. Perder en Afganistán no producirá un efecto dominó islamista que les lleve a conquistar Andalucía, o a que los USA comiencen a sufrir onces de septiembre con armas de destrucción masiva. Pero el que los USA se hubiesen retirado del centro de Europa y de la OTAN, sí habría sido una catástrofe para la seguridad del Occidente y de los USA. Permitir que Irán y Corea del Norte se hagan con armas nucleares y capacidad balística, sí tendrá un efecto tremendo en la consiguiente proliferación de armas nucleares, en la libertad de acción de los Ayatolas, y en que USA estaría mucho más disuadida a la hora de tratar con Irán. Ha sido infinitamente más importante para la seguridad y la libertad de los pueblos del Occidente (y las democracias en general), las retiradas y fracasos de Moscú, y las ampliaciones de la OTAN, que los atentados de Madrid, Londres o Nueva York. Esto es algo indiscutible y que muchas veces se pasa por alto. (Por si interesa, el resto está en el URL de abajo)
http://apocalipsismad.blogspot.com/2009/04/obama-y-la-desnuclearizacion-una-idea.html
Gates está violando de forma muy flagrante el hecho estratégico de que las contrainsurgencias nunca se han ganado, jamás, por la vía del material. Se han ganado por la vía de la superioridad cuantitativa en el número de soldados en el terreno, en doctrinas adaptadas a la situación, y en tener una estrategia política edecuada.
Eso es algo que vimos claramente con el Surge de Petraeus en Irak (en el que la llegada masiva de MRAPs fue posterior al triunfo de ese plan para reducir la "violencia"). Plantear la politica militar en afrontar la amenaza menos importante que tienen que afrontar hoy los USA, amenazas que no se vencen con superioridad material (el paradigma perfecto es la guerra de Vietnam), Lo único que se consigue es retrasar la toma de decisiones políticas y estratégicas claves para resolver lo de Afganistán (afrontar de una vez y de forma clara lo de Pakistán, el comercio de opio a Europa, etc), y debilitar la necesaria gran superioridad material que se necesita para seguir manteniendo la estructura estratégica unipolar de la que EE.UU. hoy disfruta. No olvidemos en el lamentable estado que quedaron los FAS de EE.UU. tras haber echado toda la carne en el asador en Vietnam, guerra que tal y como se planteo iban a perder sí o sí.
La carencia de una visión estratégica mundial de Robert Gates, hace que se concentre solamente en lo inmediato (que además para ganar "lo inmediato" tampoco hace falta desviar muchos recursos económicos de un país como USA) y no en lo importante. Diríase que los árboles no le dejan ver el bosque.
Nadie puede decir, es muy rídiculo pensar, que el empeoramiento de la situación en Afganistán se debe a que no había MRAP-ATV, o que escaseaban los Predator o Reaper (que no dejan de ser necesarios). Alguien debería atreverse a pensar, en consecuencia, que no será con sacrificando armamento "más convenciona" en pos de MRAP-ATV y UCAV como los USA resolverán sus problemas en Afganistan, la insurgencia islámica global, y resto de competidores estratégicos.
Aunque a la "industria" le pese, habría que redimensionar los programas Leopardo, S-80, EF-2000 y A-400-M (éste último puede que no haga falta redimensionarlo, a este paso se cae solito). De estos programas se pueden liberar varios miles de millones de euros para atender a las auténticas necesidades de las FAS.
Para cuando una entrada sobre la tan anunciada segunda fase del programa de renovación de vehículos blindados, a este paso será imposible cumplir los plazos de entrega, y eso que era la "prioridad número uno" del Gobierno
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